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Abstract
A central unanswered question in economic theory is that of price formation in disequilibrium.
This paper lays the groundwork for a model that has been suggested as an answer to this question
in, particularly, Arrow [Toward a theory of price adjustment, in: M. Abramovitz, et al. (Ed.), The
Allocation of Economic Resources, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1959], Fisher [Disequi-
librium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983]
and Hahn [Information dynamics and equilibrium, in: F. Hahn (Ed.), The Economics of Miss-
ing Markets, Information, and Games, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989]. We consider sellers that
monopolistically compete in prices but have incomplete information about the structure of the
market they face. They each entertain a simple demand conjecture in which sales are perceived
to depend on the own price only, and set prices to maximize expected profits. Prior beliefs on
the parameters of conjectured demand are updated into posterior beliefs upon each observation of
sales at proposed prices, using Bayes’ rule. The rational learning process, thus, constructed drives
the price dynamics of the model. Its properties are analysed. Moreover, a sufficient condition is
provided, relating objectively possible events and subjective beliefs, under which the price process
is globally stable on a conjectural equilibrium for almost all objectively possible developments
of history.
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1. Introduction
In economic theory, a key role in the coordination of behavior is played by prices. As a
consequence, the so-called price mechanism is much debated, and the need for it operating
freely often stressed. Yet, there are many open research questions on the matter of prices,
especially on how they come to take on equilibrium values. For one thing, it is generally left
unexplained whose business it actually is to call and change prices. Particularly in models
in which price-taking behavior is assumed, this is a pressing question. Reliance on a unique
price vector indicates it is left to a single person or institution, and a number of models
has been presented in which the central person is in fact an altruistic auctioneer, e.g. in the
taˆtonnement process, the Edgeworth process, and the Hahn process.1
Apart from the fact that it seems odd, if not plainly inconsistent, to model all behavior but
that of the auctioneer as resulting from constrained rational choice, at least two things meet
the eye in these explanations. First, these processes need an exogenous central coordinator
to explain the rise of equilibria that are meant to be the outcome of decentralized competitive
economies. Second, the conditions these processes need for convergence on equilibrium
price values for arbitrary initial prices, i.e. for global stability of the disequilibrium process—
have been found to be pretty strong.
A number of suggestions has been made to study the disequilibrium behavior of prices
more seriously. An early one is in Arrow (1959), in which Arrow proposed to make price
a choice variable of individual firms, that consequently need to come equipped with some
local monopoly power, at least as a disequilibrium phenomenon. To Arrow, the construct
of perfect competition did not allow for an explanation of price behavior. More recently,
Fisher (1983) develops an elaborate model of disequilibrium behavior in which there is
clarity on who is setting prices. It is done by dealers, who specialize in differentiated goods,
which gives them the local monopoly power to act as a coordinator and set prices. How
prices are adjusted with changes in perceptions, however, is not discussed in depth in the
monograph, yet indicated as an area of promising further research. Finally, in Hahn (1989)
several partial examples are given of perception changes and associated behavior that may
indeed be plausible for monopolistically competing price-setters to develop—including a
rudimentary version of the behavior we study in this paper. Yet, the consequences of such
behavior, particularly when performed in general equilibrium settings, are only hinted upon.
When prices are choice variables of firms, the way firms perceive their market position,
and especially changes in these perceptions, can account for the dynamics of prices. This
idea is used in the present paper to construct a model of individually rational price adjust-
ment and study its limit behavior, particularly its stability properties. In the present model,
each of a number of firms is in monopolistic price competition, but does not have perfect
information on the market demand it faces. At each moment in time, based on its infor-
mation to date on past prices and sales, each firm entertains a demand conjecture instead.
Naturally, this conjecture has a structural form different from that of objective demand.
Particularly, we consider the most extreme case where firms only consider their own price
as an explanatory variable, and do not consider the price effects of competing products.
1 For an extensive survey of the disequilibrium literature and its problems, as well as pointers to an alternative
modeling route on which the present model takes a small step (see Schinkel, 2001).
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Within their conjectured structures, firms learn in a Bayesian way about the value of the
demand parameters it has modeled. A fleshed out conjecture serves as a basis for an optimal
price through expected profit maximization.
It is shown that for initial beliefs that do not assign zero probability to developments
of prices and sales that can actually happen, the incomplete beliefs converge to a finite
limit, and, therefore, prices converge as well. This is called ‘No Statistical Surprise’. Con-
vergence takes place on a set of ‘conjectural equilibria’. Under ‘No Statistical Surprise’,
therefore, the price process is globally stable in that it reaches an equilibrium for ev-
ery initial belief-structure. Which particular equilibrium is reached depends on the ini-
tial beliefs. This path-dependency result runs solely over beliefs, since the model assumes
absence of trade at disequilibrium prices. The stability result does not rely on specific
conditions on the structure of objective demand. Instead, the condition of ‘No Statistical
Surprise’ is sufficient for the perceived structure to absorb all price effects on objective
demand.
The literature on Bayesian or rational learning is quite recent and large. Our paper builds
on several of its results. One focus has been the concern to justify the use of rational
expectations equilibria. Particularly Bray and Savin (1986), and Bray and Kreps (1987)
work in this direction, and establish convergence results for myopic Bayesian learners on
rational expectations equilibrium in versions of the cobweb-model. Early work by Blume
and Easley (1982, 1986) is also concerned with the influence learning has on the eventual
equilibrium situation reached, but in a general equilibrium setting. Particularly, they focus
on conditions under which Bayesian learners will identify the true model among several
models.
In partial equilibrium models of single firms learning their demand, Easley and Kiefer
(1988) among others, study the influence of active learning on firms’ optimization problems.
Actively learning firms are aware of the fact that their behavior influences their options
for learning. In a discrete game theoretical setting, Kalai and Lehrer (1993, 1995) have
obtained results for rational learning behavior. The former reference, Kalai and Lehrer
(1993), considers learning in a correctly specified structure, and states conditions under
which it converges to a Nash equilibrium of the perfect information game that are similar
to ours.
Another, much less extensively traveled route has been to study the influence of structural
mis-specification on the convergence process and its equilibria. Kirman (1975, 1983, 1995)
sets up an early example of two firms learning, in a least squares way, in a mis-specified
structure of their game. However, he does not establish general convergence results. Nyarko
(1991) constructs an example of a single, actively learning monopolist whose beliefs do not
settle, due to a very particular structural specification error. Kalai and Lehrer (1995) extends
the 1993 convergence conditions to structurally mis-specified models to identify the usable
notion of equilibrium. However, their article does not present explicit convergence results.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model structure. Section 3
introduces the way in which information is processed, as well as an associated equilibrium
concept. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the convergence result, the nature of which is subse-
quently discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents the global stability of the price process on
the equilibria of the model, introducing the concept of ‘No Statistical Surprise’. Section 8
closes with some concluding remarks on possible extensions of the model.
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2. The model
Consider an economy with n different firms. Each firm i has the ability to produce its
own commodity, that is, it is supposed to take decisions on, particularly, price and quality
of the commodity it produces. In this paper, we will assume that the aggregate of all these
strategic choices to be made by firm i are incorporated into one single action space Pi. For
technical reasons each Pi is assumed to be a convex and compact metric space.
2.1. Objective demand
The objective demand for each commodity i is assumed to be non-deterministic. In order
to model this, let the commodity space of firm i be denoted by Xi. One can think of this
space as being the collection of all possible realized demands for its commodity firm i might
face. From a technical point of view, we only need few restrictions on this commodity space
though, and we will only assume it is a compact metric space.
Suppose that firm i has decided to take action pi in Pi. We write p := (pi)i∈N ∈ P :=
ΠiPi for the entire vector of decisions taken. Now the demand for commodity i is supposed
to be given by the density function
fi(xi|p)
with respect to the probability measure νi defined on the Borel σ-algebra B(Xi) generated
by the metric on the commodity space Xi. For technical reasons, we assume that for any
open set U ⊂ Xi we have νi(U) > 0. Further, by fi(xi|p) being defined with respect to νi
we mean that∫
Xi
fi(xi|p) dνi = 1.
We will also assume that the function fi : Xi × P → R is continuous.
2.2. Perceived demand
None of the firms is fully aware of the mechanism that generates the demand it faces.
Instead, each firm i has a collection Θi of ‘worlds’ it deems possible. In world θi ∈ Θi,
it conjectures that it serves a demand function that is distributed according to the density
function
gi(xi|pi, θi)
with respect to νi. Again, we assume for technical reasons thatΘi is a compact metric space
and that gi: Xi × Pi ×Θi → R is continuous.
Note that subjective demand conjectures deviate importantly from objective demand:
each firm only considers the effect of its own decision on the demand for its commodity,
and neglects the influence of the decisions of the other commodities. In effect, each firm
believes that it is a monopolist on its own market. This structural mis-specification reflects
incomplete information on the side of the firms. We focus on this extreme situation where
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only the effect of a firm’s own decision is considered for reasons of exposition. The analysis
could be extended to include less severe forms of incomplete information, e.g. structures in
which the effects of the actions taken by several of the nearest competitors are included.
2.3. Expected profits
Within its structural mis-specification of how the world works, each firm i believes that
there exists a ‘true’ world. However, it does not know which of possible worlds in Θi is
the true one. Instead, the firm’s perception of the world is stochastic. This means that each
firm i has a belief represented by an element of the set P(Θi) of probability measures on
Θi. Such a belief µi ∈ P(Θi) assigns to each Borel subset A of Θi a real number µi(A) that
reflects the probability firm i assigns to the event that the real world is an element of A.
Further, let
πi(pi, xi) ∈ R
be the net profit of demand xi when firm i decides to take action pi (we will assume throughout
the paper that πi is continuous). Then, given a belief µi of firm i, the amount Πi(pi, µi) of
money firm i expects to earn is given by
Πi(pi, µi) =
∫
Θi
∫
Xi
πi(pi, xi)gi(xi, θi|pi) dνi dµi.
Since each firm i is assumed to be rational it will aim to maximize Πi(pi, µi) and take
an optimal decision. In the remainder of this paper, we need each firm to have a unique
optimal decision given the belief µi. In other words, we need to know that there is exactly
one decision in Pi, which we will denote by pi(µi), for which Πi(pi(µi), µi) is larger than
or equal to Π(pi, µi) for any other possible action pi of firm i in Pi. In order to guarantee
the existence of such a unique optimal decision, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Given the belief µi of firm i the function Πi(pi, µi) is strictly concave.
This is, for example, the case if for each xi and θi the integrand πi(pi, xi)gi(xi, θi|pi) is
strictly concave in pi.
Note that pi(µi) need not maximize expected profits in an objective sense. This is so since,
although the world is in fact stochastic, it is stochastic in a way different from perception.
More specifically, given the vector p(µ) := (pi(µi))i∈N of individual decisions, objective
demand is distributed on Xi according to
fi(xi|p(µ)),
which shows how the true sales opportunities depend on the beliefs of all firms. And in turn
these opportunities determine the objective expected net profit. In other words, the objective
expected net profit of firm i is in fact given by∫
Xi
πi(pi, xi)fi(xi|p(µ)) dνi.
No firm is, of course, capable of tuning its behavior to this true expected net profit.
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3. Information processing and conjectural equilibrium
Beliefs are updated according to the Bayesian updating rule, as follows. Suppose that µi
is the current belief of firm i in P(Θi). Now the observation of demand xi in Xi induces the
updated belief Bi(µi)(xi) in P(Θi) that assigns to a Borel set A ⊂ Θi the probability
Bi(µi)(xi)(A) :=
∫
A
gi(θi|pi(µi), xi) dµi∫
Θi
gi(θi|pi(µi), xi) dµi
provided of course that the denominator is not equal to zero. In order to guarantee that this
is the case, independent of the belief µi we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. For all pi, θi and xi,
gi(xi|pi, θi) > 0.
Given this assumption it can be shown that the above formula indeed yields a mapping
Bi : P(Θi)×Xi → P(Θi),
from the space of probability measures times the space of quantities Xi back to the space
of probability measures.2 This particular updating method, known as Bayesian updating, is
firmly founded in probability theory. It is, therefore, sensible from the firms’ perspective to
extract information from past observations in this way.
Although it does make perfect sense from the perspective of the firms, the learning process
described is ill-founded in objective terms since it is based on an unrecognized structural
mis-perception of demand. Hence, in general it cannot be hoped that subjective perceptions
will come to explain the true demand for a commodity. Yet, there is a natural candidate
for beliefs that are in ‘equilibrium’ with the objective world. Consider a single firm. The
firm’s beliefs are in equilibrium if perceived optimal decisions made on the basis of this
belief return quantities that are no ground for a revision of beliefs. This is the concept of
individual conjectural equilibrium.
Definition 1. An individual conjectural equilibrium for firm i is a belief µi for which for
all xi ∈ Xi
Bi(µi)(xi) = µi.
Since the observed sales depend on the decisions of all firms, it is quite special for a
single firm to be in individual conjectural equilibrium. Yet, if all firms simultaneously are
in individual conjectural equilibrium, none has a reason to deviate unilaterally from its
decision, since no firm believes it can improve its position by doing so. This leads us to
consider the following notion of an equilibrium for our economy.
Definition 2. A conjectural equilibrium is a vector µ = (µi)i∈N of beliefs such that each
µi is an individual conjectural equilibrium.
2 The technicalities supporting this statement can be found in Appendices A and B.
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4. Learning dynamics, infinite histories and beliefs
In Section 3, we saw that firms have mis-specified models of the true state of the world
and they are not aware of this false interpretation of their environment. Nevertheless, given
their mis-specification of the way the world works, they are aware of the fact that they are
not fully informed about the true state of the world. This lack of information is modeled as
a probability distributionµi0 (the initial belief) over the collectionΘi of all worlds that firm
i deems possible. This belief reflects the amount of prior information firm i has concerning
the true state of the world.
Now since each firm is a profit maximizer and since it is aware of the fact that it is not fully
informed, it is eager to learn more about the true state of the world from market experience.
It does so in the following way. Given its prior belief µi0 firm i sets its (subjective) optimal
decision pi(µi0). Once each firm has made this move, the objective demand density function
establishes the quantities that can actually be sold given the actions p0 := pi(µi0)i∈N . This
means that for each firm i a quantity xi1 is drawn from the probability measure that assigns
to each Borel set A ⊂ Xi the probability∫
A
fi(xi|p0) dνi.
This new information is ground for a revision of beliefs via Bayesian updating. Repeating
this procedure yields a learning process with the following properties.
At a given time τ = 0, 1, . . . , each individual firm i has recorded a history of consumer
demands
hiτ = (xit)τt=1
of finite length τ. This market information is the basis of the belief µiτ(hiτ) of firm i at
time τ concerning the state of the world. It then takes a new action pi(µiτ(hiτ)) based on its
current belief. Given the vector pτ := (pi(µiτ(hiτ)))i∈N of new decisions, firm i observes
a new quantity xiτ+1 drawn from the probability distribution that assigns to each Borel set
A ⊂ Xi the probability∫
A
fi(xi|pτ) dνi.
Subsequently, beliefs are updated according to the Bayesian updating rule. Formally,
µiτ+1(hiτ, xiτ+1) := Bi(µiτ(hiτ))(xiτ+1).
Note that the decision on pi(µiτ(hiτ)) the firm takes at time τ is a function only of the beliefs
at time τ, which in turn derive from the initial beliefs µi0 and the recorded history up until
τ. Hence, it is sufficient to record sequences of observed quantities, as the firms do.
We have, thus, constructed a well-specified process in which beliefs lead to perceived
optimal decisions pτ , which serve as endogenous signals to obtain new information about
the parameters of the distribution of objective demand. This new information, in turn, leads
to an update of beliefs and, therefore, to new optimal decisions pτ+1 in a disequilibrium
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Fig. 1. The development of beliefs and prices over time.
price dynamics that embodies both subjectively rational learning and subjectively rational
actions (Fig. 1).
In order to study the dynamic properties of this decision process, we make use of martin-
gale convergence theory. For that purpose, we need to construct an underlying probability
space on which we can identify martingales. This is the space of all possible future devel-
opments of history a firm i foresees at the beginning of time.3 Formally, let
Hiτ :=
τ∏
t=1
Xi
be the space of all histories hiτ of length τ. B(Hiτ) denotes the Borel σ-algebra on Hiτ .
Further, let Hi :=
∏∞
t=1Xi be the space of infinite histories. A specific element of Hi is
denoted by hi. By B(Hi) we denote the Borel σ-algebra generated by the product topology
on Hi.
To complete the probability space of all future histories, we need a measure λi on B(Hi).
Formally this λi is defined inductively on histories of finite length, combined with infinite
extensions. We will now go through this construction step by step. First note that it is in
fact sufficient to specify the numbers
λi

Dτ × ∞∏
t=τ+1
Xi


for each Borel set Dτ in Hiτ . Because, once these numbers are known, there is a unique way
to extend λi to B(Hi). So we only need to specify the numbers
λiτ
(
τ∏
t=1
Dt
)
,
where λiτ is the probability measure induced by the beliefs of firm i up till time τ. Once
these numbers are known, λi follows straightforwardly. In fact,
λi

 τ∏
t=1
Dt ×
∞∏
t=τ+1
Xi

 := λiτ
(
τ∏
t=1
Dt
)
,
3 We deviate somewhat from the structure generally chosen for this purpose, e.g. in Easley and Kiefer (1988),
though in essence the spaces are the same.
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the probability that an infinite history starts with a history hiτ in the set
∏τ
t=1Dt . In order
to specify these numbers we naturally start with λi0(∅) := 1. Further, for τ = 1,
λi1(D1) :=
∫
D1
∫
Θi
gi(xi, θi|pi(µi0)) dµi0 dνi.
In order to now define λiτ+1 inductively, assume that λiτ is known. Let hiτ be a history
of length τ. Then the transition probability γiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) of ending up in Dτ+1 ⊂ Xi
provided we have observed history hiτ is equal to
γiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) :=
∫
Dτ+1
∫
Θi
gi(xi, θi|pi(µiτ(hiτ))) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi.
The transition probability gives the subjective probability of an observation xiτ+1 being in
Dτ+1 given that the firm has already observed history hiτ and subsequently believes that
µiτ(hiτ) is the appropriate probability distribution over Θi. We then have
λiτ+1
(
τ+1∏
t=1
Dt
)
:=
∫
Hiτ
∫
Xi
1∏τ+1
t=1Dt
dγiτ+1(hiτ) dλiτ
=
∫
Hiτ
1∏τ
t=1Dt
∫
Xi
1Dτ+1 dγiτ+1(hiτ) dλiτ
=
∫
Hiτ
1∏τ
t=1Dtγiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) dλiτ
=
∫
∏τ
t=1Dt
γiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) dλiτ.
The definition reflects how λiτ+1 derives as the weighted ‘sum’ (i.e. the integral) of all
transition probabilities, where the weights are the probabilities λiτ the firm assigns to the
observation that conditions the particular transition probability. The first step easily follows
from rewriting the indicator function on the product set as a product of indicator functions.
It is then observed that the inner integral equals γiτ+1(hiτ)(Diτ+1). Finally, the indicator
function is replaced by the restricted integral.
Now notice that, since the above computation implies that for all sets Dτ in B(Hiτ), we
have
λiτ+1(Dτ ×Xi) =
∫
Dτ
γiτ+1(hiτ)(Xi) dλiτ =
∫
Dτ
1Hiτ dλiτ = λiτ(Dτ),
the measures λiτ are consistent. Therefore, by the theorem of Kolmogorov, there is a unique
probability measure λi on B(Hi) such that
λi

Dτ × ∞∏
t=τ+1
Xi

 = λiτ(Dτ).
for all Borel sets Dτ in B(Hiτ).
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An appealing way to think aboutλi is as the probability firm i initially assigns to observing
the infinite historyhi ∈ Hi, based on its prior beliefs and its awareness of the learning process
it is about the engage in. An example may help to clarify this.
Example 1. A stochastic variable X takes on one of two values, x1 or x2. The probability
of x1 (and, hence, x2) depends on a parameter θ, that is either θ1 or θ2. Let Pr(x1, x2|θ1) =
(1/3, 2/3) and Pr(x1, x2|θ2) = (1/2, 1/2) be the conditional probabilities of x1 and x2,
and suppose µ0 = (1/4, 3/4) are the prior beliefs on (θ1, θ2). Over time, a sequence of
observations (xt)t∈N molds beliefs. We have
γ1(X1 = x1) = 14 × 13 + 34 × 12 = 1124 = λ1(X1 = x1),
γ1(X1 = x2) = 14 × 23 + 34 × 12 = 1324 = λ1(X1 = x2).
Suppose X1 = x1. Application of Bayes’ rule now gives posterior beliefs
µ1|(X1 = x1) =
(
1
4 × 13
1
4 × 13 + 34 × 12
,
3
4 × 12
1
4 × 13 + 34 × 12
)
=
(
2
11
,
9
11
)
.
Similarly, X1 = x2 would return
µ1|(X1 = x2) =
(
1
4 × 23
1
4 × 23 + 34 × 12
,
3
4 × 12
1
4 × 23 + 34 × 12
)
=
(
4
13
,
9
13
)
.
We then have the conditional transition probabilities
γ2(X2 = x1|X1 = x1) = 211 × 13 + 911 × 12 = 3166 ,
γ2(X2 = x2|X1 = x1) = 211 × 23 + 911 × 12 = 3566 ,
γ2(X2 = x1|X1 = x2) = 413 × 13 + 913 × 12 = 3578 ,
γ2(X2 = x2|X1 = x2) = 413 × 23 + 913 × 12 = 4378 .
The λ-measure for the t = 2 paths is now constructed by combining the conditional transi-
tion probabilities, as follows.
λ2(X1 = x1, X2 = x1) = λ1(X1 = x1)γ2(X2 = x1|X1 = x1) = 1124 × 3166 = 31144 .
Similarly, we find
λ2(X1 = x1, X2 = x2) = 1124 × 3566 = 35144 ,
λ2(X1 = x2, X2 = x1) = 1324 × 3578 = 35144 ,
λ2(X1 = x2, X2 = x2) = 1324 × 4378 = 43144 .
Finally, the posteriors follow from Bayes’ rule as
µ2|(X1 = x1, X2 = x1) =
(
4
31 ,
27
31
)
,
M.P. Schinkel et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 483–508 493
µ2|(X1 = x1, X2 = x2) =
(
8
35 ,
27
35
)
= µ2|(X1 = x2, X2 = x1),
µ2|(X1 = x2, X2 = x2) =
(
16
43 ,
27
43
)
.
5. Convergence of beliefs and actions
The prime interest in this paper is to know whether, given initial beliefs, the process of
Bayesian updating will eventually converge to a conjectural equilibrium. That is, we ask
whether learning will teach some invariable posterior ideas, or whether perceptions, and
thus decisions, will keep on changing forever. In order to address this question we will
employ a convergence theorem concerning martingales. For that, we will show that on the
probability space (Hi, B(Hi), λi) constructed above beliefs indeed form a martingale. To
that end, we first need to introduce some notation.
Consider an infinite history hi = (xit)∞t=1 in Hi. The finite history hiτ := (xit)τt=1 in Hiτ
is called the truncation of hi till time τ. Further, let A be a Borel set in B(Θi). Consider the
function µiτ (A) from Hi to R that assigns to an infinite history hi the real number
µiτ(A)(hi) := µiτ(hiτ)(A).
Secondly, notice that the above truncation of infinite histories to histories of length τ
induces a natural identification of each element Dτ of the σ-algebra B(Hiτ) with the set
Dτ ×
∞∏
t=τ+1
Xi
in B(Hi). The subalgebra of B(Hi) of sets of this form is denoted by Bτ(Hi).
First notice that Bτ(Hi) is a subset of Bτ+1(Hi) and that each function µiτ (A) is
Bτ(Hi)-measurable. We will now show that the sequence (µiτ(A))∞τ=1 is even a martin-
gale. In order to do that we need the following.
Lemma 1. Let φ a bounded and Bτ+1(Hi)-measurable function. Then we have∫
Hi
φ(hi) dλi =
∫
Hiτ
∫
Xi
φ(hiτ, xiτ+1)
∫
Θi
gi(xiτ+1θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi dλiτ.
Proof. Let D×Dτ+1 ×
∏∞
t=τ+1Xi be a Borel set in Bτ+1(Hi). Then∫
Hi
1D×Dτ+1×
∏∞
t=τ+2Xi dλi
=
∫
Hi,τ+1
1D×Dτ+1 dλiτ+1 = λiτ+1(D×Dτ) =
∫
Hiτ
1Dγiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) dλiτ
=
∫
Hiτ
∫
Xi
1D×Dτ+1
∫
Θi
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi dλiτ.
The same equality now easily follows for an arbitrary integrable function. 
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Now, we can prove the following.
Theorem 1. Let A be a Borel set in B(Θi). Then the sequence (µiτ(A))∞τ=1 of random
variables is a martingale with respect to λi.
Proof. Let A be a Borel set in B(Θi) and let C be a Borel set in Bτ(Hi). We have to check
that ∫
C
µiτ+1(A)(hi) dλi =
∫
C
µiτ(A)(hi) dλi.
Since C is an element of Bτ(Hi), we know it can be written as
Dτ ×
∏
t=1
Xi
for some Borel set Dτ in Hiτ . So, since λi agrees with λiτ+1 on Bτ+1(Hi), Lemma 1 yields∫
Dτ×
∏
t=1Xi
µiτ+1(A)(hi) dλi
=
∫
Dτ×Xi
µiτ+1(hiτ, xiτ+1)(A) dλiτ+1
=
∫
Dτ
∫
Xi
µiτ+1(hiτ, xiτ+1)(A)
∫
Θi
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi dλiτ.
Plugging Bayes’ rule into this expression yields∫
Dτ
∫
Xi
∫
A
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ)∫
Θi
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ)
∫
Θi
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi dλiτ
and the two integrals over Θi cancel out. Which reduces the above expression to∫
Dτ
∫
Xi
∫
A
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi dλiτ.
To this expression we can apply the theorem of Fubini and switch the order of integration
over Xi and A. This yields∫
Dτ
∫
A
∫
Xi
gi(xiτ+1, θi|piτ) dνi dµiτ(hiτ) dλiτ
=
∫
Dτ
∫
A
1Θi dµiτ(hiτ) dλiτ =
∫
Dτ
µiτ(hiτ)(A) dλiτ,
where the first equality results from the fact that gi is a density function with respect to νi.
This concludes the proof. 
The result that beliefs form a martingale may not be very surprising. It states that the
nature of Bayesian learning is such that a firm does not expect to change its beliefs in
the future. Of course, an actual observation will in general change beliefs, but based upon
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current beliefs on future realizations of sales, a firm ex ante predicts it will not. One way
to interpret this is as Bayesian learning being sufficient, in that the information present at a
given time is used to the full.
Example 2. In our earlier example, it is easy to see that beliefs have the martingale property.
The expectation Eλ(·) taken with respect to λ is
Eλ(µ1(θ1)) = 1124 × 211 + 1324 × 413 = 14 = µ0(θ1),
and similarly
Eλ(µ2(θ1)) = 11144 × 431 + 35144 × 835 + 43144 × 1643 = 14 = µ0(θ1).
With the above result in hand, we can apply martingale convergence theory to study the
limit beliefs of agents, and hence of decisions, as follows.
Take an infinite history hi in Hi. Let µiτ(hi) be the probability measure in P(Θi) that
assigns to each Borel set A of Θi the real number µiτ(hi)(A).
Theorem 2. There exists a Borel set S of infinite histories in Hi with λi-probability one, on
which the sequence (µiτ(hi))∞τ=1 of probability measures converges weakly to a probability
measure µi∞ (hi) for every history hi in S.
Proof. We will first construct S. Since Θi is compact and metric, we know that there exists
a countable basis of the topology. Let U be the collection of finite intersections of elements
of this basis. Take a fixed element U of U. By Theorem 1, the sequence (µiτ(U))∞τ=1 is a
martingale. So, by the martingale convergence theorem (see, e.g. Doob (1990), Theorem 4.1
(iv)) there is a set S(U) of infinite histories in Hi withλi(S(U)) = 1 such that (µiτ(hi)(U))∞τ=1
converges for every history hi in S(U).
Now since U is the collection of finite intersections of a countable collection, it is a
countable set itself. This implies that
S :=
⋂
U∈U
S(U)
has λi-probability one, since it is a countable intersection of sets S(U), all having λi-
probability one.
The construction of the limit probability measure can be done as follows. Take a history
hi in S. First observe that, sinceΘi is compact, Theorem 6.1 of Billingsley (1968) states that
P(Θi) is sequentially compact. So, we know that a subsequence of (µiτ(hi))∞τ=1 converges
weakly to some probability measure, say µi∞(hi). We will show that the original sequence
converges weakly to this probability measure. To this end, notice that
µiτ(hi)(U)→ µi∞(hi)(U), for allU ∈ U
for the original sequence, since this sequence is convergent for every element U of U by
construction of S, and so the above also holds for the weakly convergent subsequence. More-
over, U is closed under finite intersections and each open set is obviously a countable union
of elements of U since U contains a countable basis of the topology on Θi by construction.
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Hence, by Theorem 2.2 of Billingsley (1968), (µiτ(hi))∞τ=1 converges weakly to µi∞(hi)
and the proof is complete since hi was chosen arbitrarily in S. 
From now on we will automatically assume that we only consider histories hi in S
whenever we talk about µi∞(hi). Effectively, we only consider the domain of µi∞. We
can now prove the following result.
Theorem 3. The sequencepi(µiτ(hi))∞τ=1 of actions λi-almost-surely converges to the limit
decision pi(µi∞(hi)).
Proof. By the continuity of pi established in Lemma 4 of Appendix A, we know that the se-
quence pi(µiτ(hi))∞τ=1 of optimal decisions given beliefs at time τ converges to pi(µi∞(hi))
whenever the sequence µiτ(hi)∞τ=1 of beliefs converges to µi∞(hi). This happens with
λi-probability one by Theorem 2. 
6. The nature of limit beliefs and limit actions
We now know that in our model beliefs, and consequently decisions, converge to limit
beliefs and unique limit decisions, respectively, for λi-almost-all developments of history.
In this section, we will derive some properties of the limit beliefs and decisions. We will
show that a limit belief is unique in the sense that, roughly speaking, it only puts weight on
worlds that generate the same probability distribution over demands. In other words, any
two worlds in the support of a limit belief will have identical probability distributions over
demands. Thus, a limit belief selects a unique possible world out of the collection of worlds
that are possible initially, up to the identification of worlds of course that generate identical
probability distributions. Furthermore, we will show that the limit beliefs obtained support
a conjectural equilibrium.
6.1. Unique limit beliefs
For an analysis of the limit properties of beliefs and decisions, consider the following
construction. Let µi be a probability measure on Θi. Evidently Θi is a compact set with
µi(Θi) = 1. So, the collection
K := {K ⊂ Θi|K is compact andµi(K) = 1}
is not empty. Thus, we can define the support of µi by
supp(µi) :=
⋂
K∈K
K.
The only question is whether this set has probability one according toµi. To this end, no-
tice that the topology onΘi has a countable basis, sayB, sinceΘi is separable and metric. So,
supp(µi) =
⋂
B∈B:µi(B)=0
Θi\B.
Hence, µi(supp(µi)) = 1 by the subadditivity of µi.
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A more colloquial definition of the support of a probability measure µi on Θi is to say
that it is the smallest compact subset K of Θi with µi(K) = 1. In any event, it enables us to
give the following definition.
Definition 3. A belief µi does not distinguish between signals if there exists a function
hi : Xi → R, such that for any θi in supp(µi) and for all xi in Xi
gi(xi|pi(µi), θi) = hi(xi).
This condition on µi states that every world θi in the support of µi generates the same
density function on Xi. In other words, each signal has the same probability in each world
in the support of µi. Consequently, no signal xi will give firm i a reason to change its belief.
A more interesting fact is that the converse of this observation is also true. This is reflected
in the following result.
Theorem 4. A belief µi does not distinguish between signals if and only if
Bi(µi)(xi) = µi
holds for all xi in Xi.
Proof. Suppose that µi does not distinguish between signals. Then we can take hi : Xi →
R, such that
hi(xi) = gi(xi|pi(µi), θi), for all θi ∈ supp(µi).
Consequently, for any xi ∈ Xi and any Borel set A in Θi we have
Bi(µi)(xi)(A)=
∫
A
gi(xi|pi(µi), θi) dµi∫
Θi
gi(xi|pi(µi), θi) dµi =
∫
A
hi(xi)1supp(µi) dµi∫
Θi
hi(xi)1supp(µi) dµi
= hi(xi)µi(A)
hi(xi)µi(Θi)
= µi(A).
Suppose, on the other hand, that µi distinguishes between signals. Then we know that there
is a pair ζi, γi ∈ supp(µi), and an x∗i ∈ Xi for which
gi(x
∗
i |pi(µi), ζi) > gi(x∗i |pi(µi), γi).
So, we can find two positive numbers U > L ∈ R and open neighborhoods N(ζi)  ζi and
N(γi)  γi such that for all θi in N(ζi)
gi(x
∗
i |pi(µi), θi) ≥ U
and for all θi in N(γi)
gi(x
∗
i |pi(µi), θi) ≤ L.
Now notice thatµi(N(ζi)) > 0 since otherwise supp(µi)\N(ζi)would be a compact set with
µi-probability one that is strictly included in supp(µi). For the same reason µi(N(γi)) > 0.
498 M.P. Schinkel et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 483–508
This implies that
Bi(µi)(x
∗
i )(N(ζi))
Bi(µi)(x
∗
i )(N(γi))
≥
∫
N(ζi)
U1Θi dµi∫
N(γi)
L1Θi dµi
= Uµi(N(ζi))
Lµi(N(γi))
>
µi(N(ζi))
µi(N(γi))
.
So, at least
Bi(µi)(x
∗
i )(N(ζi)) = µi(N(ζi))
or
Bi(µi)(x
∗
i )(N(γi)) = µi(N(γi)).
In any case, Bi(µi)(x∗i ) does not equal µi and the proof is complete. 
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. A belief µi does not distinguish be-
tween signals if and only if Bayesian updating has no effect on the belief for any possible
signal xi. This fact has important implications. Particularly, since we can show that the limit
beliefsµi∞(hi) in fact are fixed points of the Bayesian updating method, as we will do next,
upon the following preliminary result.
Let B be a countable basis of the topology on Xi. Let W be the collection of sample paths
(xit)
∞
t=1 in Hi for which there is a basis element B in B such that {xit|xit ∈ B} is finite. We
will show first that the following is true.
Lemma 2. λi(W) = 0.
Proof. Let B be an element of B and let T be a natural number. Define
W(B, T) := {(xit)∞t=1|xit /∈ B}, for all t ≥ T.
Note that this construction is such that W = ⋃B,TW(B, T). So, W is the countable union
of sets W(B, T). Hence, by the subadditivity of λi it suffices to prove that λi(W(B, T)) = 0
for any choice of B and T.
To this end, notice that
W(B, T) =
T−1∏
t=1
Xi ×
∞∏
t=T
Bc.
Now take some τ ≥ T . Denote the subset∏T−1t=1 Xi×∏τt=TBc of the set Hiτ of finite histories
up till time τ by Wiτ . Then, for a history hiτ in Wiτ , the one-step transition probability
γiτ+1(hiτ)(B) to B is
γiτ+1(hiτ)(B) :=
∫
B
∫
Θi
gi(xi, θi|piτ) dµiτ(hiτ) dνi ≥
∫
B
∫
Θi
ε dµiτ(hiτ) dνi = ενi(B).
Here, ε > 0 is chosen such that gi(xi, θi|piτ) ≥ ε for all xi and θi, which can be done by
the compactness of Xi, the continuity of gi and the assumption that gi is larger than zero on
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Xi. Consequently, γiτ+1(hiτ)(Bc) ≤ 1− ενi(B). Using this result, we get that
λiτ+1(Wiτ+1) :=
∫
Wτ
γiτ+1(hiτ)(Bc) dλiτ ≤ (1− ενi(B))λiτ(Wiτ).
Now, backwards substitution yields
λiτ+1(Wiτ+1) ≤ (1− ενi(B))τ−T+1λiT(WiT) ≤ (1− ενi(B))τ−T+1.
Further, since B is an open set, we know that νi(B) > 0 by assumption. So, 0 ≤ 1−ενi(B) <
1 and, hence,
lim
τ→∞ λiτ+1(Wiτ+1) = 0.
Finally, notice that
0 ≤ λi(W(B, T)) ≤ λi

T−1∏
t=1
Xi ×
τ∏
t=T
Bc ×
∞∏
t=τ+1
Xi

 = λiτ(Wiτ)
where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of λi and the equality from
consistency of λi with λiτ . Hence, it follows that λi(W(B, T)) = 0. 
The interpretation of this result is that firms expect a priori that the signals they will
receive are persistently exciting. That is, they expect to observe all possible quantities
infinitely many times over the course of their learning process, so that they will be able
to indeed extract sufficient information from them. The sufficiency of the information is
reflected in this theorem.
Theorem 5. There is a subset Z of S with λi-probability one such that the belief µi∞(hi)
does not distinguish between signals for any hi in Z.
Proof. Let S be as in Theorem 2 and let W be as in Lemma 2. Write Z := S\W . Clearly,
λi(Z) = 1, since λi(S) = 1 and λi(W) = 0. Now take a history hi = (xiτ)∞τ=1 in Z. Then,
since hi is an element of S we know that µi∞(hi) exists. We will show that it does not
distinguish between signals.
By Theorem 4 it suffices to show that B(µi∞(hi))(xi) = µi∞(hi) for all xi in Xi. To
this end, take an x∗i ∈ Xi. Then, since hi = (xiτ)∞τ=1 is not an element of W, we know that
it intersects each element of the basis B infinitely many times. So, since Xi is metric, this
implies that we can find a subsequence (xiα(τ))∞τ=1 of (xiτ)
∞
τ=1 such that xiα(τ) → x∗i as
τ →∞. Then, on the one hand,
B(µiα(τ)(hiα(τ)))(xiα(τ)+1) = µiα(τ)+1(hiα(τ)+1) = µiα(τ)+1(hi)→ µi∞(hi)
in the weak topology since the above sequence is a subsequence of (µiτ(hi))∞τ=1 which
converges to µi∞(hi) in the weak topology by the choice of S. On the other hand,
B(µiα(τ)(hiα(τ)))(xiα(τ)+1)→ B(µi∞(hi))(x∗i )
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since B is continuous by Theorem 9 of Appendix A. Hence, since the space P(Θi) is
Hausdorff, µi∞(hi) = B(µi∞(hi))(x∗). 
Note that if we make the natural assumption that conjectured density functions of demand
are uniquely characterized by the value of θi, the result implies that the posterior distribution
converges to a measure that puts all mass on one particular world θi in Θi.
Assumption 3. For any pi ∈ Pi we have gi(xi|pi, ζi) = gi(xi|pi, γi) for all xi ∈ Xi if and
only if ζi = γi.
A measure that puts all probability on one specific world θi is called a Dirac measure.
We now have the following result.
Corollary 1. Suppose we have Assumption 3. Then µi∞(hi) is a Dirac measure for every
hi in Z.
Proof. Let hi be a history in Z. Then µi∞(hi) does not distinguish between signals by
Theorem 5. So, for any pair of worlds ζi and γi in the support of µi∞(hi) we have that
gi(xi|pi(hi), ζi) = gi(xi|pi(hi), γi)
for the unique limit decision pi(hi) := pi(µi∞(hi)) in Pi and all xi in Xi. Further, by
Assumption 3, this can only be the case if ζi = γi. Hence, the support of µi∞(hi) is
inevitably a singleton and µi∞(hi) is a Dirac measure. 
6.2. Conjectural equilibrium
Provided that the structure of perceptions satisfies Assumptions 1–3, we have shown
that with λi-probability one, firm i’s belief is a Dirac measure µi∞(hi). Consequently,
firm i’s limit decision is pi(hi) := pi(µi∞(hi)). Let θi(hi) be the unique world in the
support of µi∞(hi). The pair (θi(hi), pi(hi)) then specifies the limit stochastic view of
the world of each firm. That is, each firm i perceives demand to be distributed in the
limit as
gi(xi|pi(hi), θi(hi)).
We can now relate our results straightforwardly with our concept of equilibrium. We say
that convergence is almost sure if it is λi-almost sure for every i.
Theorem 6. The learning process almost surely converges to a conjectural equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 5 we know that the beliefµi∞(hi) of firm i does not distinguish between
signals on Z. So, by Theorem 4 it is a fixed point of the Bayes operator and, hence, an
individual conjectural equilibrium. Since this holds for every firm these beliefs form a
conjectural equilibrium. 
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7. Objective convergence to conjectural equilibrium
We now know that for almost all developments of history to which a firm initially as-
signs non-zero probability, its beliefs on the parameters of conjectured market demand,
and thereby the decisions it takes, converge to a unique limit belief that puts all mass on a
single parameter of conjectured demand. For each firm, the limit decision is an individual
conjectural equilibrium.
Since these results hold for every individual firm i, we are indeed close to conclusions on
the behavior of the complete economy. However, since the conjectures that firms entertain
are structurally mis-specified, their beliefs of possible developments of history need not
necessarily match with the objective sequence of market demand they face. Consequently,
actual histories may unfold that have λi-probability zero for some firms. Firms facing such
probability zero histories will be unable to cope with it: Bayesian learning breaks down
under such shocking surprises, and convergence fails. In order to exclude the rise of such
paths, therefore, we need a condition that relates beliefs to objective probabilities.
The objective probability measure on the space of sample paths of the form hi ∈ Hi is
potentially influenced by the behavior of all firms through the objective demand functions
fi(xi|p). In fact, for given initial beliefs µ0 of the population, the unfolding sequence of
individual actions that derives from the firms’ sequential individual application of Bayes’
rule within their conjectured demand structures, lays out a complete history of the world,
when performed in the interrelated objective demand structures. For given priors, the only
stochastic influence on the individually observed history hi is from fi(xi|pτ) for each τ.
The construction of objective probabilities on space Hi requires an objective probability
measure ρi onB(Hi). Like λi, ρi is formally defined inductively on histories of finite length,
combined with infinite extensions. For τ = 0, we naturally have ρi0(∅) = 1. In order to
now define ρi,τ+1 inductively, assume that ρiτ is known. Then, given that we have a history
hiτ of length τ, we can define the transition probability δiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) for each Borel
subset Dτ+1 of Xi as
δiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) =
∫
Dτ+1
fi(xi|pτ) dνi.
Again we can define
ρiτ+1
(
τ+1∏
t=1
Dt
)
:=
∫
Xτt=1Dt
δiτ+1(hiτ)(Dτ+1) dρiτ
and apply again the Theorem of Kolmogorov. We now come to a crucial relationship between
the objective and subjective probability measures ρi and λi.
Assumption 4. The probability measure ρi is absolutely continuous with respect to prob-
ability measure λi for every firm i.
In the interpretation that we have offered for the measures λi and ρi, absolute continuity
of ρi with respect to λi implies that no actual development is possible that was not a priori
foreseen as a possibility by the firm concerned. There is, therefore, ‘No Statistical Surprise’
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on the side of firms. This may seem strong, but is an assumption that is in fact often
(implicitly) made in econometric specifications. Moreover, it seems a natural condition
necessary for beliefs to settle down, as one can hardly expect beliefs to converge if all the
time new and unforeseen events stir up the learning process. ‘No Statistical Surprise’ gives
us the following prime result.
Theorem 7. Beliefs almost surely converge to a conjectural equilibrium in the objective
sense.
Proof. By Theorem 6 we have that the beliefs of each firm i converge to an individual
conjectural equilibrium λi-almost surely. Since ρi is absolutely continuous with respect to
λi, this convergence is also ρi-almost-surely. 
Finally, again since pi is continuous, we can conclude the following on the behavior of
the individually rational disequilibrium price adjustment process.
Theorem 8. The decision vector pτ converges ρi-almost surely to a conjectural equilibrium
decision vector p∞.
8. Concluding remarks
The groundwork laid in this paper for modeling individually rational disequilibrium
price adjustment by introducing elements of imperfect competition, imperfect and incom-
plete information and learning from self-generated signals, allows for a fairly strong global
stability condition for general equilibrium models, that of ‘No Statistical Surprise’. Apart
from being intuitively appealing, and doing away with the deus ex machina approach to
disequilibrium behavior, this condition extends quite naturally on ‘No Favorable Surprise’,
the global stability condition established in Fisher (1983). Our approach also calls for a
number of extensions.
In the present model, firms gradually estimate the parameters of their conjectured demand.
Naturally, provided they have some monopsony power as well, firms could likewise be taken
to learn about supply, proposing purchase prices in the process. ‘No Statistical Surprise’ is
likely to be strong enough to obtain convergence results in such a dealer-model as well.
A more demanding extension of the model would be to further specify the relationship
between objective demand and supply structures and their subjective counterparts on which
behavior is based. The present conjectures consider only the own price effect. Typically,
firms would take the prices of several of their nearest competitors into account, applying
econometric techniques in which the costs of including additional explanatory variables, or
sharper functional forms, are weighted against the expected benefits of more precise pre-
dictions, thus, determining the best structural specification to work with. Such an approach
would lead to an optimal level of mis-specification and introduce interesting problems
concerning the strategic behavior towards rivals.
Related to this is the concept of active learning, where firms reckon with the fact
that their prices will provide future information that can be used to increase profits. The
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type of non-myopic price setting that results from this has been studied in a partial set-
ting Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), where convergence results
similar to the ones obtained here are established. The present price adjustment model
would benefit greatly from an extension of dealer behavior in this direction, even though
we expect ‘No Statistical Surprise’ to be powerful enough to again assure almost sure
convergence.
The model presented in this paper relies on a specific and exogenously given structure
of the market. Certain firms make it their business to act as intermediaries in the trade of
a particular good. Casually, this setup has been defended by an appeal to product differen-
tiation and transaction costs. It is to represent a socially accepted shopping-area structure.
Although the identification of commodities with firms, which naturally leads to this market
structure, seems quite appropriate in many markets, further specification of these underlying
properties of markets is called for. Particularly, the consequences of entry and exit, and the
possibility to compete for locally dominant dealerships raises interesting questions. For one
thing, efforts to endogenize the market structure may well result in entry conditions that
have the model sound more than presently like a disequilibrium story with a competitive
ending.
Finally, the present model is altogether silent on the issue of social consequences of the
disequilibrium dynamics modeled. In accordance with the observations by Arrow (1959)
referred to earlier, it trades efficiency of competitive equilibrium for global stability by intro-
ducing monopolistic competition as an essential disequilibrium phenomenon. The precise
welfare consequences of this seem a promising area of further research.
In the appendices we have collected those parts of the theoretical framework needed in
the paper that would disrupt the flow of the argument too much when presented in the main
body of the paper. Appendix A provides a detailed and complete proof of the continuity
of the Bayes operator. Appendix B provides proofs concerning the support of some of the
probability measures used in the text. These two appendices are largely based on Easley
and Kiefer (1988).
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Appendix A. Continuity of the Bayes operator
In this appendix, we will show that the Bayes operator defined in Section 3 is continuous.
First of all, notice that the denominator in its definition is larger than zero by Lemma 6.
So, it is easy to see that B(µi)(xi) is a non-negative function on the Borel σ-algebra on
Θi. The σ-additivity of B(µi)(xi) follows from the σ-additivity of the integral and finally it
is obvious that B(µi)(xi)(Θi) = 1. So, B(µi)(xi) is indeed a probability measure, and the
Bayes operator, thus, only takes on values in P(Θ). Back to our aim, its continuity, we first
need to establish some technicalities.
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Lemma 3. Suppose that we have a sequence (pik)∞k=1 that converges to some pi. Then there
is a number K such that for all k > K, all xi and all θi
||πi(pik, xi)gi(xi|pik, θi)− πi(pi, xi)gi(xi|pi, θi)|| < ε.
Proof. Suppose not. Then for every number n there is a number k(n) ≥ n and points xi(n)
and θi(n) such that
||πi(pik(n), xi(n))gi(xi(n)|pik(n), θi(n))− πi(pi, xi(n))gi(xi(n)|pi, θi(n))|| ≥ ε.
Since both Xi and Θi are compact we may assume w.l.o.g that the sequence xi(n)∞n=1
converges to a point xi and the sequence θi(n)∞n=1 converges to a point θi. However, since
k(n) ≥ n by construction, we know that pik(n) → pi. Hence, taking limits yields
0 = ||πi(pi,xi)gi(xi|pi, θi)− πi(pi, xi)gi(xi|pi, θi)|| ≥ ε
which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 4. The function pi : P(Θi)→ Pi is continuous.
Proof. Part (i): First, we will show that the expected payoff function
Πi : Pi × P(Θi)→ R
is continuous. Of course, we suppose that P(Θi) is endowed with the weak topology. Notice
that his topology is metrizable by Theorem 5 of Appendix III in Billingsley (1968). There-
fore, it is sufficient to establish convergence of Πi over sequences. So, take a sequence
(pik, µik)→ (pi, µi). We want to show that, given ε > 0, there exists a natural number K,
such that for all k ≥ K,
||Πi(pik, µik)−Πi(pi, µi)|| ≤ 2ε.
By the triangle inequality, we only need to show that
||Πi(pik, µik)−Πi(pi, µik)|| + ||Πi(pi, µik)−Πi(pi, µi)|| ≤ 2ε
for sufficiently large k. We will show that both terms on the left hand side of the inequality
sign are smaller than or equal to ε for sufficiently large k. The first term reads
||Πi(pik, µik)−Πi(pi, µik)||
=
∥∥∥∥
∫
Θi
∫
Xi
[πi(pik, xi)gi(xi, θi|pik)− πi(pi, xi)gi(xi, θi|pi)] dνi dµik
∥∥∥∥
≤
∫
Θi
∫
Xi
||πi(pik, xi)gi(xi, θi|pik)− πi(pi, xi)gi(xi, θi|pi)|| dνi dµik.
Now take K as in Lemma 3. Then, since νi and µik are all probability measures, for each
k ≥ K the latter expression is smaller than or equal to∫
Θi
∫
Xi
ε1Θi×Xi dνi dµik = ε.
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Furthermore, the second term reads∥∥∥∥
∫
Θi
∫
Xi
πi(pi, xi)gi(xi, θi|pi) dνi dµik −
∫
Θi
∫
Xi
πi(pi, xi)gi(xi, θi|pi) dνi dµi
∥∥∥∥ .
Because, we assume that P(Θi) is endowed with the weak topology, it suffices to show that
Fp(θi) :=
∫
Xi
πi(pi, xi)gi(xi|pi, θi) dνi
is continuous in θi. To that end, take a sequence θim → θi. Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary real
number. Let Gp be a positive real number such that
||πi(pi, xi)|| ≤ Gp, for all xi ∈ Xi.
This number exists because πi(pi, xi) is continuous in xi and Xi is compact. Now take a
natural number Mp such that for all m ≥ Mp
||gi(xi|pi, θim)− gi(xi|pi, θi)|| ≤ ε
Gp
.
Then for all m ≥ Mp
||Fp(θim)− Fp(θi)||
=
∥∥∥∥
∫
Xi
πi(pi, xi)(gi(xi|pi, θim)− gi(xi|pi, θi)) dνi
∥∥∥∥
≤
∫
Xi
||πi(pi, xi)|| ||gi(xi|pi, θim)− gi(xi|pi, θi)|| dνi.
Consequently, since νi(Xi) = 1,
||Fp(θim)− Fp(θi)|| ≤
∫
Xi
Gp
ε
Gp
dνi = ε.
Part (ii): Now let (µik)∞k=1 be a sequence converging to µi in the weak topology. Then,
since Pi is a compact metric space, every sequence has a converging subsequence. So, we
may assume without loss of generality that pi(µik) converges to some decision p∗i . We will
now show that p∗i = pi(µi).
Since pi(µik) is the optimal decision given the belief µik, we know that for an arbitrary
pi in Pi it holds that
Πi(pi(µik), µik) ≥ Πi(pi, µik), for all k.
So, by the continuity of Πi we get that
Πi(p
∗
i , µi) ≥ Πi(pi, µi),
and p∗i is an optimal action given belief µi since pi was arbitrarily chosen. Hence, p∗i =
pi(µi) by Assumption 1. 
506 M.P. Schinkel et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 483–508
Furthermore, notice that gi : Xi × Pi × Θi → R is also continuous. So, the function
h : Xi × P(Θi)×Θi → R by
h(xi, µi, θi) := gi(xi, pi(µi), θi)
is continuous as well. Now suppose we have a sequence (xin, µin)∞n=1 converging to some
limit (xi, µi). Define the functions fn and f from Θi to R by
fn(θi) := h(xin, µin, θi) and f(θi) := h(xi, µi, θi).
Now take an arbitrary ε > 0. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. There exists a natural number N in N such that ||fn− f ||∞ < ε for all n ≥ N.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a subsequence (fk)∞k=1 of (fn)
∞
n=1 and a sequence (θik)
∞
k=1
such that
|fk(θik)− f(θik)| ≥ ε, for all k ∈ N.
Since Θi is compact we may assume that the sequence (θik)∞k=1 converges to some limit θi.
Then for all k ∈ N
ε ≤ |fk(θik)− f(θik)| = |h(xik, µik, θik)− h(xi, µi, θik)|.
However, since xik → xi, µik → µi and θik → θi, the continuity of h yields
ε ≤ |h(xi, µi, θi)− h(xi, µi, θi)|
so that we arrive at a contradiction. 
The lemma is instrumental in the proof of the following.
Theorem 9. The Bayes operator is continuous.
Proof. Suppose that (µin, xin)∞n=1 converges to (µi, xi). It has to be shown that
Bi(µin)(xin)→ Bi(µi)(xi)
as n goes to infinity. To this end, let F be a closed µi-continuous subset of Θi. By the
Portmanteau theorem it is sufficient to show that
Bi(µin)(xin)(F)→ Bi(µi)(xi)(F).
By the definition of the Bayes operator,
Bi(µi)(xi)(F) =
∫
F
gi(xi|p(µi), θi) dµi∫
Θi
gi(xi|p(µi), θi) dµi .
Now Lemma 6 in Appendix B guarantees that the denominator is strictly positive. So,
since Θi itself is an instance of a closed set F whose boundary has measure zero (the
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boundary of Θi is the empty set after all), it suffices in turn to show that, given ε > 0,∣∣∣∣
∫
F
gi(xin|p(µin), θi) dµin −
∫
F
gi(xi|p(µi), θi) dµi
∣∣∣∣ < 2ε
for sufficiently large n. This is what we set out to do.
First, take N as in Lemma 5. Then for all n ≥ N,∣∣∣∣
∫
F
gi(xin|p(µin), θi) dµin −
∫
F
gi(xi|p(µi), θi) dµin
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
F
|fn(θi)− f(θi)| dµin ≤
∫
Θi
|fn(θi)− f(θi)| dµin
≤
∫
Θi
||fn − f ||∞ dµin ≤ εµin(Θi) = ε,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of n and N. So, now we only have to show
that for all ε > 0, there exists an N ∈ N such that for all n ≥ N∣∣∣∣
∫
F
gi(xi|p(µi), θi) dµin −
∫
F
gi(xi|p(µi), θi) dµi
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
In other words, we have to show the existence of a natural number N such that for every
n ≥ N, µin is an element of the set of probability measures νi with∣∣∣∣
∫
F
f(θi) dνi −
∫
F
f(θi) dµi
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
However, since this set is open in the weak topology and (µin)∞n=1 weakly converges to µi,
such an N exists. 
Appendix B. Sufficiently wide world views
For the Bayesian learning process to be well specified, we need that there are no objec-
tively possible events that are assigned probability zero at any time by the firm. A Bayesian
learner, namely, would simply not be able to deal with such events. Formally, it means that
the denominator of the updating rule might become zero. In this appendix, we will show
that Assumption 2 avoids this problem. Although also several somewhat weaker conditions
would guarantee that the Bayesian learning process is well defined, we prefer to work with
the above condition because of its simplicity. And that it is indeed sufficient is expressed in
the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let µi be a belief in P(Θi) and suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Let further a
decision pi, a demand xi, and a Bol set A ⊂ Θi with µi(A) > 0 be given. Then∫
A
gi(θi|pi, xi) dµi > 0.
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Proof. Take a decision pi and a demand xi. Then we know that gi(θi|pi, xi) is a contin-
uous function in the variable θi since we even assumed that gi is continuous in all three
variables together. Moreover, Θi is compact. So, there exists a real number ε > 0 such that
gi(θi|pi, xi) ≥ ε for all θi ∈ Θi. Consequently,∫
A
gi(θi|pi, xi) dµi ≥
∫
A
ε1Θi dµi = ε
∫
A
1Θi dµi = εµi(A)
which is positive since both ε and µi(A) are positive by assumption. 
References
Arrow, K.J., 1959. Toward a theory of price adjustment. In: Abramovitz, M., et al. (Eds.), The Allocation of
Economic Resources. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Billingsley, P., 1968. Convergence of Probability Measures. Wiley, New York.
Blume, L., Easley, D., 1982. Learning to be rational. Journal of Economic Theory 26.
Blume, L., Easley, D., 1986. Rational expectations equilibrium: an alternative approach. Journal of Economic
Theory 34.
Bray, M., Kreps, D., 1987. Rational learning and rational expectations. In: Feiwell, G. (Ed.), Arrow and the Ascent
of Modern Economic Theory. New York University Press, New York.
Bray, M., Savin, N.E., 1986. Rational expectations equilibria, learning, and model specification. Econometrica 54.
Doob, J.L., 1990. Stochastic Processes. Wiley, New York.
Easley, D., Kiefer, N.M., 1988. Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters. Econometrica 56.
Fisher, F.M., 1983. Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Hahn, F., 1989. Information dynamics and equilibrium. In: Hahn, F. (Ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets,
Information, and Games. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Kalai, E., Lehrer, E., 1993. Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61 (5).
Kalai, E., Lehrer, E., 1995. Subjective games and equilibria. Games and Economic Behaviour 8.
Kiefer, N.M., Nyarko, Y., 1989. Optimal control of an unknown linear process with learning. International
Economic Review 30 (3).
Kirman, A.P., 1975. Learning by firms about demand conditions. In: Day, R. (Ed.), Adaptive Economics. Academic
Press, New York.
Kirman, A.P., 1983. Mistaken beliefs and resultant equilibria. In: Frydman, R., Phelps, E. (Eds.), Individual
Forecasting and Collective Outcomes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Kirman, A.P., 1995. Learning in oligopoly: theory, simulation, and experimental evidence. In: Kirman, P.A.,
Salmon, M. (Eds.), Learning and Rationality in Economics. Blackwell, Oxford.
Nyarko, Y., 1991. Learning in mis-specified models and the possibility of cycles. Journal of Economic Theory 55.
Schinkel, M.P., 2001. Disequilibrium Theory: Reflections towards a Revival of Learning. Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, Maastricht.
